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I. Introduction
On 18 September 2004, the United Nations (UN) Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter adopted Resolution 1564 to
“rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to 
investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have 
occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring 
that those responsible are held accountable.“1
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Commission) began its 
work in October 2004 and provided its final report only three months later 
on 25 January 2005.2 There, it concluded, inter alia,
“that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide”
and that at least the central Government authorities did not act with 
genocidal intent.3 However, these findings would not exclude the possibility 
that the atrocities committed by individuals against victims were carried 
out with the specific intent to destroy and therefore could possibly fulfil all 
necessary requirements of the crime of genocide.4
Thus, the Commission was concerned with some of the most problematic 
aspects connected with the crime of genocide: firstly, the question whether 
this crime always requires a genocidal plan or policy by a state or 
organised authority and, secondly, the crucial problem of how to prove 
genocidal intent. This research paper will focus on these controversial 
1 Resolution  1564  (2004),  adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  5040th meeting,  on  18 
September 2004, UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (2004), para. 12.
2 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, UN Doc. S/2005/60 (2005).
3 Ibid., paras. 518, 640.
4 Ibid., paras. 520, 641.
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issues and their significance for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
dealing with the situation in Darfur/Sudan. Furthermore, another related 
issue that was addressed by the Commission will be analysed, namely 
which exact degree of mens rea is required for the special intent to destroy 
one of the protected groups.
Therefore, the history of the concept of the crime of genocide and its 
development from the Nuremberg judgement5 and the first legal 
formulation of the crime in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (Genocide 
Convention)6 leading to one of its most recent codifications in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute)7 will be outlined 
(II). Then, a short introduction to the basic structure and the legal elements 
of the crime will follow. This research paper will focus on a detailed 
description of the problematic aspects with an emphasis on analysing the 
relevant international case law (III). Finally, the situation in Darfur will be 
scrutinised. This chapter will primarily deal with the legal findings of the 
Commission and the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC regarding 
the arrest warrant against the Sudanese president Omar Hassan Al Bashir 
(IV).
5 IMT, judgement of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings  
of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (22nd August, 
1946 to 1st October, 1946).
6 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, 
78 UNTS (1949), 277.
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, 37 ILM (1998), 999 et seq.
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II. The Crime of Genocide – History and Developments
1. The First Definition of the Crime of Genocide and the Nuremberg 
Trial
In 1944, Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin introduced the definition of the 
crime of genocide into legal literature and created the term “genocide” as 
such by combining the Greek word “genos” for race or tribe and the Latin 
word “cide” (or caedere) for to kill.8 At that time, one of the most atrocious 
manifestations of the crime of genocide took place: the extermination of 
the European Jews during the Third Reich. After World War II and the 
victory over Nazi Germany, the four victorious powers decided to put the 
major German representatives of the Third Reich on trial and therefore 
concluded on 8 August 1945 the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London 
Agreement) and, as its appendix, the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Charter).9 The London Agreement 
constituted the legal basis for the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal. The Nuremberg Charter contained all the relevant 
provisions concerning the implementation of the trial. Article 6 (c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter listed the crimes under the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the International Military Tribunal namely crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.10 Interestingly, genocide was not 
included explicitly but was covered by war crimes and especially by the 
8 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation. Analysis of Government.  
Proposals for Redress, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Internationa Peace, 1944, 79.
9 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European  
Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,  39  American Journal of  
International  Law (1945),  Suppl.  pp.  257  et  seq.  See  also  Gerhard  Werle,  Principles  of 
International Criminal Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005, para. 17.
10 See Werle (2005), para. 19.
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crimes against humanity of “extermination” and “persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”.11 The fact that crimes against 
humanity were only punishable if there existed a link to war crimes or 
crimes against peace prevented the prosecution of criminal acts 
perpetrated before the beginning of World War II because this special 
connection could not be proven in many cases.12 Therefore, the 
International Military Tribunal did not deal with the heinous acts of 
persecution of Jews between the takeover of the Nazi party in 1933 and 
the aggression against Poland in September 1939. Even the atrocities 
committed during the war were not the centre of attention during the 
Nuremberg Trial; instead it mainly focused on the prosecution of the war of 
aggression and war crimes.13 Thus, the part of the Nuremberg judgement 
which exclusively deals with the persecution of the Jews before and during 
World War II is quite short and the term “genocide” was not used at all.14
2. The Genocide Convention
Due to the abhorrent atrocities committed against the Jews during the 
Nazi regime the world community came to a consensus on taking action 
on the international level and to appropriately criminalise such conduct, 
punish the perpetrators and establish a system of judicial cooperation 
11 Antonio Cassese,  International Criminal Law, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009, 127; Guenael Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, Oxford: Oxford 
University  Press,  2005,  194;  Frank  Selbmann,  Der  Tatbestand  des  Genozids  im 
Völkerstrafrecht,  Leipzig:  Universitätsverlag  Leipzig,  2003,  39  et  seq.;  Gerhard  Werle, 
Principles of International Criminal Law,  2nd edition,  The Hague: TMC Asser Press,  2009, 
para. 697.
12 William A. Schabas, “National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the Crime of the 
Crimes.”  Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003), 39 at 41; Selbmann (2003), 40; 
Werle (2005), para. 23.
13 Angela Paul,  Kritische Analyse und Reformvorschlag zu Art. II Genozidkonvention, Berlin et  
al.: Springer, 2008, 32; Werle (2009), para. 697.
14 Mettraux (2005), 195 et seq.; Selbmann (2003), 39.
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between states.15 Thus, the first formulation of the crime of genocide in an 
international legal document followed in 1948 when the Genocide 
Convention was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly and 
entered into force in 1951.16 However, it lasted 50 years until the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention were applied for the first time by an 
international court when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor of the Rwandan commune 
of Taba, for the crime of genocide and sentenced him to life 
imprisonment.17
Today, the prohibition of genocide is acknowledged under customary 
international law and constitutes ius cogens.18 The definition of Art. II of the 
Genocide Convention was reproduced almost word by word by each of the 
statutes of the international criminal courts, namely Art. 4 (2) of the Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY 
Statute), Art. 2 (2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR Statute), and Art. 6 of the ICC Statute. In addition, the 
statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals adopted Art. III of the Genocide 
Convention on punishable acts verbatim (Art. 4 (3) of the ICTY Statute; 
Art. 2 (3) of the ICTR Statute).
3. The ad hoc Tribunals
In the early 1990s, two international ad hoc Tribunals were established by 
15 Cassese (2009), 127 et seq.; Paul (2008), 27 et seq.; Werle (2009), para. 693.
16 Paul (2008), 48; Selbmann (2003), 53 et seq.; Werle (2009), para. 698.
17 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998.
18 ICJ,  “Reservations  to  the  Convention  on the  Prevention  and  Punishment  on  the  Crime of 
Genocide, Gutachten v. 28. Mai 1951”, ICJ Rep. 1951, 23; see also, for example, Prosecutor v.  
Akayesu,  ICTR (Trial  Chamber),  judgement of 2 September 1998, para 495;  Prosecutor v.  
Musema,  ICTR (Trial  Chamber),  judgement  of  27  January 2000,  para.  151;  Prosecutor  v.  
Rutaganda, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 6 December 1999, para. 46.
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the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of its Charter.19
In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) was set up in The Hague to deal with crimes under international 
law, namely grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 
January 1991.20 Thus, the ICTY was the first international criminal court 
entrusted with subject-matter jurisdiction for the crime of genocide. So far, 
23 persons, all of them Serbs, were indicted for the crime of genocide, but 
only two accused were convicted of this charge:21 Radislav Krstic was 
found guilty, inter alia, for aiding and abetting genocide and sentenced to 
35 years of imprisonment. In this judgement, the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the Trial Chamber's findings that genocide had been committed 
on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely in the area of 
Srebrenica in July 1995 where male Bosnian Muslims of military age were 
executed on a large scale.22 Another accused, Vidoje Blagojevic, was also 
convicted on the count of complicity to commit genocide through aiding 
and abetting genocide by Trial Chamber I of the ICTY for his participation 
in the massacre of Srebrenica23 but this conviction was quashed on appeal 
19 See Werle (2005), paras. 45 et seq.
20 See, for example, Paul (2008), 60 et seq.; Werle (2005), paras. 48 et seq.
21 For  further  information  see  http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 (last  accessed:  22  October 
2009). See also Andreas Bummel and Frank Selbmann, “Genozid – Eine Zwischenbilanz der 
Rechtsprechung  des  Internationalen  Strafgerichtshofes  für  das  ehemalige  Jugoslawien.” 
Humanitäres  Völkerrecht  –  Informationsschriften 19 (2006),  58  at  59 et  seq.  with  a  good 
overview of the ICTY case law until July 2005; Martin Mennecke and Eric Markusen, “The 
International Criminal  Tribunal  for the Former Yugoslavia and the Crime of Genocide” in: 
Steven  L.  B.  Jensen  (ed.),  Genocide:  Cases,  Comparisons  and  Contemporary  Debates, 
Kopenhagen: The Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2003, 293 at 311 et seq.
22 Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 19 April 2004, para. 37. Thus, 
the Appeals Chamber confirmed the findings of the Trial Chamber in this regard, Prosecutor v.  
Krstic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 August 2001, para. 598.
23 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 17 January 2005, para. 797.
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for lack of evidence.24 Similarly, in other cases the commission of genocide 
in other regions and times of the conflict could also not be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt.25
While the ICTY mainly focuses on the prosecution of war crimes 
committed during the armed conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established in 1995 
in Arusha primarily concentrates on the investigation and prosecution of 
genocidal acts directed against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda in 1994 when 
approximately 800,000 people were exterminated within three month.26
The jurisdiction of ICTY and ICTR contributed to a great extent to the 
further development and specification of international criminal law but, at 
the same time, demonstrated some shortcomings, inter alia, regarding the 
crime of genocide.
4. The International Criminal Court
With the adoption of the ICC Statute on 17 July 1998 and its entry into 
force after its ratification by 60 State parties on 1 July 2002, the first 
permanent international criminal court was established in The Hague to try 
individuals for committing crimes under international law, namely 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of 
24 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 9 May 2007, paras. 119 et 
seq.
25 See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 1 September 2004, para. 989; 
Prosecutor v. Stakic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 31 July 2003, para. 561; Prosecutor  
v.  Sikirica et  al.,  ICTY (Trial  Chamber),  judgement  on  Defence  Motion  to  acquit  of  3 
September 2001, para. 84 et seq; Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 14 
December 1999, para. 98, 108.
26 See John R.W.D. Jones, “Whose Intent is it Anyway? Genocide and the Intent to Destroy a 
Group.”  in  L.C.  Vohrah  et  al.  (eds.),  Man's  Inhumanity  to  Man,  The  Hague:  Kluwer  Law 
International, 2003, 467 at 469 et seq.; Paul (2008), 62 et seq.; Werle (2005), paras. 54 et seq.
7
 
 
 
 
aggression.27 Although a revision of the definition of the crime of genocide 
was discussed during the preparatory process for the ICC Statute, an 
essential modification of this crime had never been under consideration. 
Some delegations suggested to include social and political groups into the 
provision or to provide a legal definition of the special intent but finally 
none of these modifications were introduced. Thus, the wording of Art. 6 of 
the ICC Statute is the same – apart from the introductory phrase – as in 
Art. II of the Genocide Convention without any serious objections on the 
part of the State parties.28
Today, the ICC is investigating four situations, all of them situated in 
Africa: those of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central 
African Republic, and Darfur/Sudan. While the first three situations were 
referred to the ICC by the states concerned (self-referrals), the latter one 
was referred by the UN Security Council.29
III. Legal Elements of the Crime of Genocide
1. Basic Structure of the Crime of Genocide
According to Art. 6 of the ICC Statute and the corresponding provisions of 
the statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals which are, as aforementioned, 
verbatim adoptions of Art. II of the Genocide Convention, the crime of 
27 The ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression not until the State parties 
agree on a definition of this crime and the conditions under which the Court shall exercise its 
jurisdiction (Art. 5 (2) of the Statute). See Werle (2005), paras. 56 et seq.
28 Payam  Akhavan,  “The  Crime  of  Genocide  in  the  ICTR  Jurisprudence.”  Journal  of  
International  Criminal  Justice 3  (2005),  989  at  999  et  seq.;  Claus  Kress,  “The  Crime  of 
Genocide under International Law.” International Criminal Law Review 6 (2006), 461 at 467; 
Valerie Oosterveld, in: Roy Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court – Elements of Crimes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2001, 41 et seq.; 
Paul (2008), 68 et seq.; William A. Schabas, in: O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes. Article by Article, 2nd edition, 
München: C.H. Beck, 2008, Art. 6, para. 2; Werle (2009), para. 698.
29 For  further  information  see  http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last 
accessed: 22 October 2009).
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genocide is defined as 
“[...] any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
Thus, the crime of genocide comprises an objective and a subjective side:
The actus reus (material elements) requires the perpetration of one of the 
punishable acts directed against one or more members of one of the 
protected groups. Although the wording of the provision alludes to 
“members” and “children”, it is widely accepted that an attack against, at 
least, one single individual can be sufficient.30 The list of acts that 
constitute genocide as well as the enumeration of the four groups are 
exhaustive. Other groups, for example political, social or economic 
entities, are consequently not protected.31
30 See Elements of Crimes for ICC Statute, Art. 6 (a) to (e), no. 1; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR 
(Trial Chamber),  judgement of 2 September 1998, para 521; Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and 
Olivia Swaak-Goldman (eds.),  Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal  
Law. The Experience of International and National Courts. Volume I. Commentary, The Hague 
et  al.:  Kluwer  Law International,  2000,  125 et  seq.;  Paul  (2008),  176;  John Quigley,  The 
Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis, Aldershot, Hampshire  et al.: Ashgate, 
2006, 98 et seq.; William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, 158; Otto Triffterer, “Kriminalpolitische und dogmatische 
Überlegungen zum Entwurf  gleichlautender  “Elements  of  Crimes” für  alle  Tatbestände des 
Völkermordes.”  in:  B.  Schünemann  et  al.  (eds.),  Festschrift  für  Claus  Roxin  zum  70.  
Geburtstag am 15. Mai 2001, Berlin et al.: de Gruyter, 2001, 1415 at 1433; Werle (2009), para. 
725;  critical  view  Cassese  (2009),  134;  other  view  Hans  Vest,  “Humanitätsverbrechen  – 
Herausforderung  für  das  Individualstrafrecht?”  Zeitschrift  für  die  gesamte  
Strafrechtswissenschaft 113 (2001), 457 at 477.
31 Prosecutor v.  Krstic,  ICTY (Trial  Chamber),  judgement  of 2 August  2001, para.  554; Ilias 
Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, 3rd edition, London et al.: Routledge – 
Cavendish, 2007, 141; Kress (2006), 473; Selbmann (2003), 155; Werle (2009), paras. 707, 
721 et seq. The  Akayesu  Trial Chamber held a different view: “protection of any stable and 
9
 
 
 
 
The mens rea (mental elements) of the crime of genocide consists of two 
different aspects:32
Firstly, the perpetrator has to commit the genocidal act with general intent 
in the sense of Art. 30 of the ICC Statute (intent and knowledge) regarding 
the material elements of the crime. The perpetrator must, at least, act with 
dolus eventualis, the mere negligent commission of the crime does not 
suffice.33 However, the use of the words “deliberately” in Art. 6 (c) and 
“intended” in Art. 6 (d) of the ICC Statute clearly indicate that dolus 
eventualis does not fulfil the mental requirements of these underlying 
crimes.34 In contrast, for the crime of forcibly transferring children of the 
group into another group, the Elements of Crimes on Art. 6 (e) of the ICC 
Statute rule that it is even sufficient that the perpetrator should have 
known that the person or persons he forcibly transferred were under the 
age of 18 years (“negligence standard”).35
Secondly, the commission of genocide requires that the perpetrator acts 
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, one of the target groups as 
such. The actual annihilation of the group in its entirety is not required.36 
Furthermore, the destruction of the group must be the final goal of the 
perpetrator. In other words, it is required that the group's annihilation forms 
permanent group”, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 
1998, paras. 516, 701.
32 See  Cecile  Aptel,  “The  Intent  to  Commit  Genocide  in  the Case  Law  of  the  International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.”  Criminal Law Forum 13 (2002), 273 at 275; Kress (2006), 
484; Quigley (2006), 101; Ulrich Roßkopf,  Die innere Tatseite des Völkerrechtsverbrechens, 
Berlin: BWV, 2007, 109 et seq.; Selbmann (2003), 165; Werle (2009), paras. 748 et seq.
33 Paul (2008), 240; Werle (2009), para. 751.
34 Kress (2006), 485; Werle (2009), para. 750.
35 Kress (2006), 485; Werle, para. 752.
36 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 497; see 
also Aptel (2002), 280; Nina H. Jorgensen, “The definition of genocide: Joining the dots in the 
light  of  recent  practice.”  International  Criminal  Law Review 1  (2001),  285 at 299;  Werle 
(2009), para. 701.
10
 
 
 
 
the (preliminary) objective of the criminal conduct.37 It is essential for the 
crime of genocide that the victim is not attacked for any reason of its 
“individual identity” but because of its membership in a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group.38 The intent to destroy is the crucial element 
which distinguishes it from other crimes under international law (in 
particular from persecution as a crime against humanity) as well as 
murder, serious assault or other “ordinary” offences under domestic law39 
and “lends the crime its international dimension”.40 Different terms are 
used to label this particular subjective element like “genocidal intent”, 
“special intent/intention“, “specific intent/intention“ or “dolus specialis”.41
2. Problematic Aspects
Although the wording of the provision against genocide has not been 
changed since its formulation in 1948 there still remain ambiguities as to 
the exact definition of the crime. This paper will focus on three aspects:
• Firstly, it has to be analysed whether the crime of genocide requires 
some kind of objective contextual element.
• Secondly, the related problem of proving genocidal intent will be 
discussed; this problem has caused some difficulties to the ad hoc 
37 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 5 July 2001, paras. 46, 50 et seq; 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 520; see 
also Mettraux (2005), 210; Werle (2009), para. 754.
38 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 521; for 
further references see Werle (2009), para. 756.
39 Akhavan  (2005),  992;  Bantekas/Nash  (2007),  141;  Barbara  Lüders,  Die  Strafbarkeit  von 
Völkermord  nach  dem  Römischen  Statut  für  den  Internationalen  Strafgerichtshof, Berlin: 
BWV, 2004, 91; Mettraux (2005), 209; Roßkopf (2007), 112.
40 Werle (2009), para. 701; see also Kai Ambos, “Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens Rea 
Requirements  of  the  Crimes  of  the ICC Statute  and  of  the Elements  of  Crimes.”  in:  L.C. 
Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man's Inhumanity to Man, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, 11 
at 18; Lüders (2004), 93.
41 See Aptel (2002), 277 with further references.
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Tribunals.
• Thirdly, the controversial issue which degree of intent is required 
regarding the special intent of the crime merits discussion.
a) Genocidal plan or policy – A legal element of the Crime of 
Genocide?
In recent years, it has increasingly been argued that some kind of 
objective contextual element is needed as a legal ingredient of the crime 
of genocide. Schabas, for example, submits that the original concept of 
this crime as it was envisaged by its creator Lemkin would comprise a 
planned genocidal campaign as a sine qua non.42 Indeed Lemkin stated 
the following:
“[Genocide] is intended [...] to signify a coordinated plan or different actions aiming 
at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the 
aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”43
In addition, the need for a circumstantial requirement is often educed from 
the fact that the commission of genocide is almost inconceivable if there is 
no genocidal plan or policy on the part of a state or an associated 
organisation.44 A single perpetrator who does not act in a broader 
organised context would simply not be in the position to threaten the 
existence of a protected group, in whole or in part. Therefore, his criminal 
prosecution falls not in the responsibility of the international community.45 
42 Schabas (2009), 246; William A. Schabas, “The Jelisic Case and the Mens Rea of the Crime of 
Genocide.” Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001), 125 at 134.
43 Lemkin (1944), 79.
44 See, for example, Bummel/Selbmann (2006), 66; Claus Kress,  “The Crime of Genocide and 
Contextual Elements.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 (2009), 297 at 300; Schabas 
(2009),  246;  Schabas  (2001),  134;  Hans  Vest,  “A Structure-Based  Concept  of  Genocidal 
Intent.“ Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007), 781 at 784; Vest (2001), 482.
45 Kress (2009), 301; Vest (2001), 482.
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In this regard, it is further argued that the subsumption of isolated acts that 
are (unrealistically) aimed at the destruction of a protected group under 
the definition of genocide would trivialise this crime.46
The supporters of a policy element further stress the character of genocide 
as a mass or collective crime47 and draw a parallel to other crimes under 
international law. All three of them – crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression – would entail a real threat to internationally 
protected values in the form of a widespread or systematic attack, an 
armed conflict or an aggression as such.48 Genocide – as the “crime of 
crimes”49 – could not have a broader scope and should also include an 
actually existing danger for one of the protected groups. Some authors 
also allude to the ICC Statute were both crimes against humanity and war 
crimes are directly linked to a state or organisational plan or policy: While 
Art. 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute defines “attack directed against any civilian 
population” as ”a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of 
acts [...] pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack”, Art. 8 (1) of the ICC Statute states that the court's 
jurisdiction shall be activated in particular when war crimes were 
“committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”50
46 Kress (2009), 302; Kress (2006), 471; Oesterveld, in: Lee (2001), 45; Schabas (2001), 138.
47 Claus Kress,  “The Darfur Report  and Genocidal  Intent.“  Journal of International Criminal  
Justice 3 (2005), 562 at 566; Kress (2006), 470; Jones, in Vohrah et al. (2003), 468; Schabas 
(2009), 244; Vest (2007), 784 et seq.; Vest (2001), 482.
48 Kress (2009), 301.
49 Prosecutor v.  Serushago,  ICTR (Trial  Chamber),  judgement of  5 February 1999, para.  15;  
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 4 September 1998, para. 16.
50 Schabas (2009), 243; Schabas,  “Has Genocide Been Committed in Dafur? The State Plan or 
Policy Element in the Crime of Genocide.“ in: R. Henham and P. Behrens (eds.), The Criminal  
Law of Genocide, Aldershot  et al.: Ashgate, 2007, 39 at 45; Triffterer, in Schünemann  et al.
(eds.) (2001), 1417, 1434; Vest (2007), 784 et seq.
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Another point that is consistently mentioned is the special relationship 
between crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide which is 
partly regarded as a special type of the former.51 Therefore, some authors 
demand that both crimes should provide a similar contextual 
requirement.52
However, pursuant to the mere wording of Art. II of the Genocide 
Convention the crime of genocide does not require an objective contextual 
element. The special intent to destroy does also not refer to an overall 
genocidal pattern that has to be covered by the perpetrator's mind. There 
is no indication contained in this provision that a genocidal plan or policy 
on the part of governmental authorities or any other organisation is 
needed. Proposals concerning this matter were not able to achieve 
acceptance during the drafting process of the Genocide Convention.53
The case law of the ad hoc Tribunals is also quite clear on that issue: in its 
Jelisic judgement of 1999, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY stated in 
reference to the Genocide Convention
“that the drafters of the Convention did not deem the existence of an organisation 
or a system serving a genocidal objective as a legal ingredient of the crime”.54
This view was confirmed on appeal (“the existence of a plan or policy is 
not a legal ingredient of the crime”55) and almost consistently held by 
51 Schabas, in: Henham/Behrens (2007), 40; Vest (2001), 475; similarly Kress (2006), 469; other 
view Cassese (2009), 144; Jorgensen (2001), 288;Werle (2005), para. 631.
52 Jones, in Vohrah et al. (2003), 468, 479; Kress (2005), 575 et seq.; Kress (2009), 301; Kress 
(2006), 472 (“[...] variation lies in the fact that the collective activity constitutes an objective 
contextual element in the case of crimes against humanity while it forms an objective point of 
reference of the intent requirement in the case of genocide”).
53 Lüders (2004), 164; Paul (2008), 267, 270; Schabas (2001), 133 et seq (citing: UN Doc. E/AC.
25/SR4, at 3 – 6).
54 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 14 December 1999, para. 100.
55 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 5 July 2001, para. 48.
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different chambers of both ad hoc Tribunals.56 In consideration of the fact 
that genocidal acts need not necessarily be committed within the course of 
other similar deeds nor have to be part of a genocidal plan or policy, the 
chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals concluded that it is at least theoretically 
conceivable that one single individual commit the crime of genocide 
(concept of the lone genocidaire).57
An exception of this otherwise uniform jurisdiction is contained in one 
decision of the ICTY. While dealing with the distinction between crimes 
against humanity and genocide, the Krstic Trial Chamber ruled that
“[...] acts of genocide must be committed in the context of a manifest pattern of 
similar conduct, or themselves constitute a conduct that could in itself effect the 
destruction of the group, in whole or part, as such.”58
Here, the chamber was apparently oriented on the Finalized Draft Text of 
the Elements of Crimes on Art. 6 of the ICC Statute of 2 November 200059 
and almost perfectly reproduced their wording. However, the Appeals 
Chamber vehemently rejected this view and took up the position that a 
contextual element was not part of international customary law at the time 
of the commission of the crimes under consideration60 and that
56 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Simba, ICTR (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 27 November 
2007, para. 260; Semanza v. Prosecutor, ICTR (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 20 May 2005, 
para. 260; Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement on Defence Motion 
to Acquit  of  3  September 2001, para.  62;  Prosecutor  v.  Krstic,  ICTY (Appeals Chamber), 
judgement of 19 April 2004, paras. 222 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR 
(Appeals Chamber), judgement of 1 June 2001, para. 138. The Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial 
Chamber was the first that took up this position by stating that “a specific plan to destroy does 
not constitute an element of genocide”, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR (Trial 
Chamber), judgement of 21 May 1999, para. 94.
57 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 14 December 1999, para. 100.
58 Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 August 2001, para. 682.
59 PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2  (available  at  http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/ecICC.pdf;  last  accessed:  22 
October 2009). The Trial Chamber repeatedly refers to this draft (Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY 
(Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 August 2001, paras. 498, 509, 541).
60 Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 19 April 2004, para. 223 et seq.
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“[t]he intent requirement of genocide [...] contains none of the elements the Trial 
Chamber read into it.”61
It remains to be seen if the ICC will follow this approach. While the text of 
Art. 6 of the ICC Statute does not include any substantive modification to 
the Genocide Convention, the associated Elements of Crimes in reference 
to Art. 6 of the ICC Statute stipulate that
“[t]he conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct 
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such 
destruction.”62
Thus, at least the Elements of Crimes require a certain genocidal context 
of which the individual act has to form part. It appears that the concept of 
the lone genocidaire can not be accommodated apart from the unlikely 
scenario of an isolated perpetrator in possession of a weapon of mass 
destruction that could cause the annihilation of a protected group, in whole 
or in part.
However, it is imperative to consider the legal character of the Elements of 
Crimes to appreciate their impact on the definition of the crime of genocide 
as it is acknowledged under customary international law. According to Art. 
21 (1) (a) of the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes belong to the 
sources of law that shall be primarily applied by the court. Art. 9 (1) of the 
ICC Statute states, on the other hand, that they shall only “assist the Court 
in the interpretation and application” of the crimes under its jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, they need to be consistent with the provisions of the ICC 
61 Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 19 April 2004, para. 222.
62 See Elements of Crimes for the ICC Statute, Art. 6 (a) to (e), last element listed for each crime.
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Statute, Art. 9 (3) of the ICC Statute. In case of contradictions between the 
Elements of Crimes and the ICC Statute, the latter prevails.63 Thus, the 
function of the Elements of Crimes is confined to the systematisation and 
clarification of Arts. 6, 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute.64 They shall give a 
guideline for the interpretation of these provisions but can not add any 
material elements if there is no respective indication in the wording of the 
ICC Statute.65
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that even the ICC Statute itself 
as an international treaty is in principle only applicable among the State 
parties.66 The ICC Statute certainly codifies to a great extent international 
rules which were considered by the member states to be customary law at 
the time of its adoption.67 However, Art. 10 expressly states that
“[n]othing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way 
existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this 
Statute.”
Thus, neither the ICC Statute nor the Elements of Crimes have the power 
to modify existing rules of customary international law; in particular they 
can not change ius cogens. Rules in the Statute or the Elements of Crimes 
that deviate from customary law are in principle exclusively valid within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.68
63 Lüders (2004), 99 et seq.; Werle (2005), para. 138.
64 Ambos, in Vohrah et al. (2003), 12.
65 Paul (2008), 70; Werle (2009), para. 746.
66 By July 2009, 110 countries are State parties to the ICC Statute but some countries like the 
United  States  of  America,  India  or  China  are  still  not  included  (http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome+Statute.htm;  last 
accessed: 22 October 2009).
67 See Triffterer, in: Schünemann et al. (eds.) (2001), 1420; Werle (2005), paras. 139, 141.
68 Akhavan (2005), 996.
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Nevertheless, both legal instruments constitute expressions of the opinio 
iuris of the State parties and are therefore crucial for the development of 
customary law. As above mentioned, the State parties decided without 
further discussion to adopt the wording of Art. II of the Genocide 
Convention almost unchanged in the ICC Statute.69 The inclusion of some 
kind of objective contextual element only arose during the preparatory 
work for the Elements of Crimes. The United States of America strongly 
argued in favour of such an element to place emphasis on the severe 
character of the crime of genocide. First, they suggested that the mens 
rea should include a “plan to destroy such group in whole or in part”. In the 
further course of the drafting process, they modified their proposal and 
demanded the incorporation of “a widespread or systematic policy or 
practice” concept which was strongly criticised by other delegations.70 
Finally, the State parties agreed on the above cited circumstance 
requirement and integrated it into the Elements of Crimes. However, it is 
moot whether the intention of the member states was the creation of an 
additional material element or rather the limitation of the ICC's jurisdiction 
to serious cases committed in a greater context while isolated acts of 
genocide should be left to national courts. According to the introduction of 
the Elements of Crimes on genocide, the court has to decide on a case-
by-case basis on
“[...] the appropriate requirement, if any, for a mental element regarding this 
circumstance [...].”
69 Akhavan (2005), 999 et seq.; Kress (2006), 467; Paul (2008), 68 et seq.; Schabas, in: Triffterer 
(ed.) (2008), Art. 6, para. 2; Werle (2009), para. 698.
70 Oesterveld, in: Lee (ed.) (2001), 45 et seq; Paul (2008), 271; Schabas (2009), 250 et seq.; 
Schabas, in: Triffterer (ed.) (2008), Art. 6, para. 5 (with further references).
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Thus, the drafters of the Elements of Crimes shied away from determining 
the perpetrator's state of mind in respect of the contextual element and 
hence left its legal character undefined. The decision whether a subjective 
element is required at all and, if so, how it should be defined is left at the 
disposal of the judges.71
The discussion above demonstrates that an objective contextual element 
is not acknowledged under customary law as a legal ingredient of the 
crime of genocide.72 Although the inclusion of such an element was 
disputed during the negotiations of both the Genocide Convention and the 
ICC Statute, the State parties in both instances finally refrained from doing 
so. The reluctance to determine a mens rea requirement for the last 
common element in the Elements of Crimes on genocide also indicates 
the uncertainty of its legal character and its general existence. Thus, there 
is no consensus among the states in this regard.
Actually, there is no need to supplement the crime of genocide – whose 
specific systematic element is contained in its mens rea73 – by adding an 
objective contextual element, even less in form of a state plan or policy. 
This would rather restrict the scope of a crime whose wording remained 
unchanged since 60 years and that is perfectly acknowledged under 
customary law. As shown above, the ad hoc Tribunals also strongly 
rejected the existence of a policy requirement.
71 See Ambos, in Vohrah  et al. (ed.) (2003), 13; Roberta Arnold,  “The  Mens Rea of Genocide 
under the Statute of the International Criminal Court.“ Criminal Law Forum 14 (2003), 127 at 
31; Lüders (2004), 159; Oesterveld, in: Lee (ed.) (2001), 48 et seq.; Triffterer, in: Schünemann 
et al. (eds.) (2001), 1435.
72 Werle (2009), para. 746.
73 Lüders (2004), 164; Werle (2009), para. 743.
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The criminalisation of genocide is aimed at the prevention of the 
commission of genocidal acts at the earliest point in time. Thus, it is 
indispensable to include “initial acts in an emerging pattern”74 even though 
they did not (yet) form part of an overall genocidal plan or policy of a state 
or organisation.75 Besides, it is not absolutely unthinkable that isolated 
perpetrators who do not act within the framework of a genocidal campaign 
are able to impose a serious threat to the existence of one of the protected 
groups. Here, cases of emerging tensions between different groups that 
escalate without premeditation or the assassination of charismatic leaders 
should be kept in mind.76
b) Proof of Genocidal Intent
While a genocidal plan or policy is not acknowledged as a legal element of 
the crime of genocide, its existence can become important in another 
context namely the proof of genocidal intent.
The intent to destroy is the essence of the crime of genocide but, at the 
same time, it is quite difficult to prove this subjective element beyond 
reasonable doubt. The Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated in its Akayesu 
judgement
“that intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine”.77
In the absence of direct evidence78 like confessions, authorised documents 
74 According to the Introduction of the Elements of Crimes on Art. 6 of the ICC Statute these 
initial acts are covered by the term “in the context of”.
75 Arnold (2003), 133; Paul (2008), 270.
76 Boris Burghardt and Julia Geneuss,  “Der Präsident und sein Gericht. Die Entscheidung des 
Internationalen  Strafgerichtshofs  über  den  Erlass  eines  Haftbefehls  gegen  Al  Bashir.” 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 4 (2009), 126 at 134; Lüders (2004), 163; 
Paul (2008), 270 et seq.; Triffterer, in Schünemann et al. (eds.) (2001), 1434.
77 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 523.
78 “Direct evidence is evidence that  is direct to a fact in issue [...].”,  Kirk McDonald/Swaak-
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or public statements of the perpetrator in which he explicitly expresses his 
intention to annihilate a targeted group, in whole or in part, the prosecution 
may resort to factual circumstances.79 This was declared in Akayesu80 and 
consistently confirmed by other Trial Chambers of the ICTR.81 Thus, the 
special intent to destroy was often inferred from the large scale of 
atrocities, the great number of victims and the systematic manner in which 
the Tutsi minority was targeted and attacked. Other indirect evidence82 
considered by the judges were, inter alia, the kind of weapons employed, 
the destruction of property, the use of derogatory language against 
members of the victim group or other discriminatory or racial utterances of 
the accused.
The chambers of the ICTY took the same approach in dealing with the 
proof of the specific intent to destroy. In its Jelisic judgement the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY stated:
“As to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of direct explicit evidence, be 
inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, 
the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same 
group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on 
account of their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive 
Goldman (eds.) (2000), 126.
79 See, for example, Lüders (2004), 152 et seq.; Mettraux (2005), 233 et seq.; Werle (2009), para. 
765.
80 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 523, 729 
et seq.
81 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 15 May 2003, 
paras. 313, 314; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 7 June 2001, 
paras. 62, 63;  Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 27 January 2000, 
paras. 166, 167, 928 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 6 
December  1999,  paras.  61  et  seq.;  Prosecutor  v.  Kayishema  and  Ruzindana,  ICTR  (Trial 
Chamber), judgement of 21 May 1999, paras. 93, 531 et seq.
82 “Indirect or circumstantial evidence [...]  is evidence of facts from the existence of which a 
court  may infer  the  existence  of  the  principal  fact  in  issue  or  factum probandum.”,  Kirk 
McDonald/Swaak Goldman (eds.) (2000), 126.
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and discriminatory acts.”83
In this evidentiary context, the existence of a genocidal plan or policy 
drawn up by governmental authorities or other organisations gains 
significance in so far as it can be taken into account as one of the 
circumstantial facts that indicate the perpetrator's special intent to 
destroy.84
By now, no. 3 of the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes of the 
ICC Statute explicitly sets that the
“[e]xistence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and 
circumstances.”
Thus, the approach to establish the perpetrator's genocidal intent used by 
the ad hoc Tribunals was assumed for the purposes of the ICC and will 
likely be applied in future judgements.
c) The Special Intent to Destroy – What Degree of Intent is Needed?
Those who support the view that a contextual element is a legal ingredient 
of the crime of genocide often address another related issue namely the 
required level of intent for the special intent to destroy. Some of them 
argue that the mere knowledge of the destructive effect on the targeted 
83 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 5 July 2001, para. 47. See also 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 August 2001, paras. 595 et seq.
84 Prosecutor  v.  Krstic,  ICTY  (Trial  Chamber),  judgement  of  2  August  2001,  para.  572; 
Prosecutor  v.  Jelisic,  ICTY  (Appeals  Chamber),  judgement  of  5  July  2001,  para.  48; 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 21 May 1999, 
paras. 276, 527 et seq. See also  Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), 
Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, paras. 
94, 95.
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group85 or even dolus eventualis86 were sufficient. The genocidal context of 
which the individual act had to form part built the respective point of 
reference.87 Kress proposes a combination of both aspects and states that
“the individual genocidal intent requires (a) knowledge of a collective attack 
directed to the destruction of at least a part of a protected group, and (b) dolus 
eventualis as regards the occurrences of such destruction.”88
In the following, it will be examined if a wide concept of genocidal intent is 
convincing. Therefore, the position of the ad hoc Tribunals in this regard 
will be analysed in particular.
The mere word “intent” can be used to describe different states of mind89 
but it is questionable if the phrases “dolus specialis”, “special intent” or 
“specific intent” which are frequently used by the ad hoc Tribunals to 
characterise the intent to destroy indicate a certain degree of intent.90 
While it would be conceivable that these terms mean intent in the narrow 
sense of (direct) purpose91 they presumably just emphasise that apart from 
the general intent regarding the material acts of genocide a supplemental 
element is needed, the particular intent to destroy.92 Thus, it remains in 
85 Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, “Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based 
Interpretation.“ Columbia Law Review 99 (1999), 2259 at 2288; Jones, in Vohrah  et al.(eds.) 
(2003), 468, 479; Paul (2008), 262 et seq.; Quigley (2006), 119; Vest (2007), 791; Vest (2001), 
485.
86 Alicia  Gil  Gil,  “Die  Tatbestände  der  Verbrechen  gegen  die  Menschlichkeit  und  des 
Völkermordes im Römischen Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs.“  Zeitschrift für die  
Gesamte  Strafrechtswissenschaft 112  (2000),  381  at 395;  Triffterer,  in:  Schünemann  et  al. 
(eds.) (2001), 1440 et seq.
87 Kress (2009), 304; Kress (2005), 566; Vest (2007), 784 et seq, 790.
88 Kress (2005), 577.
89 Greenawalt (1999), 2266 et seq.; Kress (2005), 572; Paul (2008), 249; Dinah L. Shelton (ed. in 
chief),  Encyclopedia of  Genocide and Crimes against  Humanity, Vol.  2,  Detroit:  Thomson 
Gale, 2005, 525; Quigley (2006), 111.
90 See Paul (2008), 249; Schabas, in: Triffterer (ed.) (2008), Art. 6, para. 7.
91 So indeed Akhavan (2005), 992; Selbmann (2003), 166.
92 See  Cassese  (2009),  137;  Lüders  (2004),  102  (“überschießende  Innentendenz”);  Schabas 
(2001), 129.
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question whether the conduct of the perpetrator must be aimed at the 
destruction of the group (dolus directus of the first degree) or if it suffices 
that the perpetrator acts with foresight of the destructive effect (dolus 
directus of the second degree).
Lemkin who coined the original definition of genocide stated that genocide 
is
“aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, 
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”93
Thus, the concept of genocide was originally construed narrowly and 
should only cover conduct that was clearly directed at the destruction of a 
protected groups.
Likewise, the International Law Commission in its commentary on the 
1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind took up 
the position that
“a general awareness of the probable consequences of such an act with respect to 
the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for the crime of genocide.”94
So far, the international case law of the two ad hoc Tribunals is slightly 
ambiguous on that matter. The position held by the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTR in its basic Akayesu judgement is not clear and to some extent even 
inconsistent. On the one hand, it stated the following:
“Genocide is distinct from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a special intent or 
dolus specialis. Special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a 
93 Lemkin (1944), 79.
94 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eight Session, UN Doc. 
A/51/10 (1996), at 87.
24
 
 
 
 
constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks 
to produce the act charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in 
"the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such".95
It further emphasised that the perpetrator has to act with “the clear intent 
to cause the offence charged”96 or respectively “with the clear intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group“.97 Insofar, it seems as if the 
chamber would construe the special intent element on a purpose-based 
approach. However, another statement of the same judgement 
contravenes this conclusion by saying that
“[t]he offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act 
committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.”98
At this point, the chamber rather alludes to the state of knowledge of the 
perpetrator than to the objectives he tried to achieve through his conduct. 
Thus, the chamber did not reach a definite decision about the quality of 
the special intent. However, other chambers of the ICTR declared that the 
perpetrator must “clearly [have] intended the result charged”99 or 
respectively that the act has to be committed “in realisation of the purpose 
of the perpetrator, which is to destroy the group in whole or in part.”100 
Hence, the ICTR tends to interpret the special intent requirement more 
narrowly as dolus directus of the first degree.
95 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para 498.
96 Ibid., para 518.
97 Ibid., para 520.
98 Ibid., para. 520.
99 See Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 27 January 2000, para. 164; 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 6 December 1999, para. 59.
100Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 7 June 2001, para. 61.
25
 
 
 
 
In its Jelisic judgement, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY also addressed the 
question of the requisite degree of intent but finally did not give a clear 
decision on that issue. After describing the position of the Prosecutor who 
perceived the special intent in a broad sense including cases where the 
accused just “knows that his acts will inevitably, or even only probably, 
result in the destruction of the group”,101 an examination of the findings in 
Akayesu followed. In the ICTY chamber's interpretation of this judgement, 
the Trial Chamber of the ICTR held the view
“that any person accused of genocide for having committed, executed or even only 
aided and abetted must have had “the specific intent to commit genocide”, defined 
as “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group as such”. The Akayesu Trial Chamber found that an accused could not be 
found guilty of genocide if he himself did not share the goal of destroying in part or 
in whole a group even if he knew that he was contributing to or through his acts 
might be contributing to the partial or total destruction of a group. It declared that 
such an individual must be convicted of complicity in genocide.”102
Here, the ICTY chamber cited a part of the Akayesu judgement where the 
ICTR chamber is not dealing with the required level of intent but with the 
distinction between aiding and abetting genocide according to Art. 6 (1) of 
the ICTR Statute and complicity in genocide punishable under Art. 2 (3) (e) 
of the ICTR Statute. At this, the ICTR chamber declared that one of the 
differences between these two modes of criminal participation is the 
existence of genocidal intent: If the perpetrator acted with the special 
intent to destroy he can be held liable under Art. 6 (1) of the ICTR Statute, 
while accomplice liability in the sense of Art. 2 (3) (e) of the ICTR Statute 
101Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 14 December 1999, para. 85.
102Ibid., para. 86.
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may be considered if the special intent is lacking but the accused 
knowingly aided and abetted the genocidal act of another person.103 The 
issue of the requisite mental state of a person who contributes to the crime 
of genocide committed by another person has no direct bearing on the 
issue of the required level of the special intent to destroy as such.104 Thus, 
the Jelisic chamber in some way misinterpreted the findings of the 
Akayesu chamber irrespective of the fact that it did not even mention the 
part of the ICTR judgement where it expressly stated that it is sufficient if 
the accused should have known that the act committed would destroy one 
of the protected groups.105
However, the accused, Goran Jelisic, who operated at the Luka detention 
facility in Brcko in 1992 and called himself “Serbian Adolf” was finally 
acquitted of the charge of genocide. On the one hand, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber found that genocide had not been committed in Brcko as such 
so that the accused could not be held liable as an accomplice. On the 
other hand, the chamber refrained from convicting Jelisic as a principal 
perpetrator because the Prosecutor was not able to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that he acted with the required intent to destroy. 
Evidentially, Jelisic himself killed several inmates at Luka camp and 
caused serious bodily harm to some of the detainees. In addition, he often 
spoke about his killings and repeatedly revealed his intention to execute a 
high number of Muslims. But the trial chamber argued that he rather had 
chosen his victims randomly and had even released some of them for 
103Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 September 1998, para. 544 et 
seq.
104Other opinion Schabas (2001), 131.
105See Quigley (2006), 114.
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incomprehensible reasons. Hence, his deeds had more been caused by 
his disturbed personality than “the clear intention to destroy a group”.106 
The use of the term “clear intention” could indicate a purpose-oriented 
interpretation of the special intent requirement but the Trial Chamber did 
not provide an in-depth discussion on the issue of the required level of 
intent.
However, the Jelisic Appeals Chamber more precisely declared that
“[t]he specific intent requires that the perpetrator [...] seeks to achieve the 
destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such.”107
On appeal, the disputable reasoning of the Trial Chamber concerning the 
proof of genocidal intent was declared inappropriate108 but for various 
reasons the Appeals Chamber refused to reverse the judgement and send 
the case back to trial.109
In its Krstic judgement one ICTY Trial Chamber dealt a little more detailed 
with the relevant question but finally also shied away to locate a generally 
accepted position. Thus, the chamber held, inter alia, that the drafters of 
the Genocide Convention regarded the crime of genocide as an
“enterprise whose goal, or objective, was to destroy a human group, in whole or in 
part”
and that this view was also upheld by the International Law Commission. 
Then, the chamber mentioned that some legal commentators contend the 
106Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 14 December 1999, para. 108.
107Prosecutor v. Jelisic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 5 July 2001, para. 46.
108Ibid., para. 69 et seq.
109Ibid., para. 74 et seq.
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view that even
“acts whose foreseeable or probable consequence is the total or partial destruction 
of the group without any necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the 
act”
can constitute the crime of genocide. Finally, it concluded that the status of 
customary international law is not settled but
“[f]or the purpose of this case, the Chamber will therefore adhere to the 
characterisation of genocide which encompass only acts committed with the goal of 
destroying all or part of a group.”110
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber primarily referred to the certain state of 
knowledge regarding the occurrences at Srebrenica and their unavoidably 
destructive effect on the Bosnian Muslim population to establish the 
genocidal intent of the Bosnian Serbs in general111 and Krstic in 
particular.112 Thus, in fact it rather relied on a knowledge-based 
interpretation of the special intent requirement than on the pronounced 
goal oriented understanding. While the Trial Chamber convicted Krstic for 
the commission of genocide as a principal perpetrator, the Appeals 
Chamber was not convinced that he committed his crimes with the special 
intent to destroy.113 Krstic was finally found guilty for aiding and abetting 
genocide.114
Other trial chambers of the ICTY interpreted the special intent to destroy 
consistently purpose oriented. Thus, in Sikirica et al., Stakic and 
110Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 2 August 2001, para. 571.
111Ibid., para. 595.
112Ibid., para. 634, 635, 644.
113Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgement of 19 April 2004, para. 134.
114Ibid., para. 135 et seq.
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Blagojevic the Tribunal referred to the definition of specific intent 
established by the Jelisic Appeals Chamber.115 In the two latter 
judgements, the ICTY Trial Chambers additionally underlined that the 
mere knowledge about the “inevitably or likely” destructive effect on the 
protected group” or genocide as a “natural and foreseeable consequence” 
of an enterprise” does not suffice but that it is rather necessary that the 
perpetrator aims for the annihilation of the target group.116
In conclusion, although the jurisprudence of both ad hoc Tribunals is not 
free of inconsistencies they rather understand the intent to destroy 
narrowly as dolus directus of the first degree which means that the 
perpetrator has to desire the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious groups in whole or in part, as such.117
Thus, the original concept of the crime of genocide as well as the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals argue for a narrow interpretation of 
the dolus specialis.118 In other words, the specific genocidal intent must 
have the quality of dolus directus of the first degree (direct intent). The 
whole spirit and purpose of the prohibition of genocide is to comprise and 
penalise certain conduct that is directly aimed at the denial of a protected 
group's right to exist.119 Thus, the special intent to destroy is the unique 
feature of genocide and its key element. The aspired annihilation of one of 
115Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 17 January 2005, para. 656; 
Prosecutor v. Stakic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 31 July 2003, paras. 520, fn. 1100; 
Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement on Defence Motion to acquit of 
3 September 2001, para. 59, fn. 165.
116Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 17 January 2005, para. 656; 
Prosecutor v. Stakic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgement of 31 July 2003, paras. 530, 558.
117Paul (2008), 242; Selbmann (2003), 166. Other interpretation of the case law of the  ad hoc 
Tribunals Quigley (2006), 112.
118See also Arnold (2003), 142; Werle (2009), para. 755.
119Werle (2009), para. 755.
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the protected groups builds the specific characteristic of the crime and 
distinguishes it from other – international and ordinary – offences.120 To 
widen its meaning and accept dolus directus of the second degree or even 
dolus eventualis as sufficient for the genocidal intent, would blur the 
difference between genocide and crimes against humanity.121 Besides, the 
distinction between the intent of the principal offenders and the intent of 
accomplices could be confused.122 Actually, other crimes under the 
statutes of the international criminal courts are adequate to cover criminal 
conduct where the clear intention to destroy is lacking (or just impossible 
to prove). Hence, the knowledge-based approach has to be rejected.
IV. Genocide in Darfur?
1. Historical Background
Recently, massive atrocities committed on the territory of Darfur – a 
Western Sudanese region – have captured the attention of the 
international community. The long-lasting conflict between nomad cattle 
herders – mainly Arab tribes – and settled agriculturalists of African 
descent escalated in 2003. The ethnic diversity was not the origin of this 
conflict but rather the struggle for scarce resources like water or land.123 In 
the course of time, the tensions more and more became ethnically 
motivated with the influence of the Sudanese government playing a 
significant role in this process.124 In 2003, rebel groups mainly composed 
of members of so-called “African” tribes attacked El Fasher, the capital of 
120Lüders (2004), 112, 114; Roßkopf (2007), 112.
121Lüders (2004), 114.
122Jorgensen (2001), 294.
123Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,  UN Doc. S/2005/60 (2005)., 
para. 55.
124Ibid., paras. 57 et seq; Burghardt/Geneuss (2009), 126 et seq.
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the Federal State North-Darfur.125 The central Sudanese government 
responded with massive military violence. For this, they did not only use 
“official” armed forces but also the so-called Janjaweed militias. These 
militias are well organised, mounted and armed Arab groups which are 
closely connected to the government in Khartoum.126 The governmental 
forces did not only combat the aggressive rebels but primarily the civilian 
population. Villages were firstly attacked by extensive air raids through the 
army. Then, the Janjaweed showed up to pillage the houses and to rape 
and kill the fleeing inhabitants.127 Today, nearly 75 per cent of the villages 
in Darfur are destroyed by fire and between 200.000 and 500.000 victims 
were killed. Until February 2005, there were approximately 2,5 million 
displaced persons who are still suffering from horrible living conditions and 
ongoing attacks on settlements and refugee camps which are occurring 
down to the present day albeit with lower intensity.128
As already mentioned, in reaction to the escalating violence and the grave 
breaches of humanitarian law in Darfur the UN Security Council 
established an independent commission of experts to investigate the 
incidents with Antonio Cassese as its chairman – the Commission of 
Inquiry. In consequence of the Commission's findings and its 
recommendation, the UN Security Council – acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter – referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC by Resolution 
1593 in March 2005, in accordance with Art. 13 (b) of the ICC Statute.129 
125Report of the Commission of Inquiry, para. 65; Burghardt/Geneuss (2009), 127.
126Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  paras.  69,  98  et  seq.;  Adam  Jones,  Genocide.  A 
Comprehensive Introduction, London et al.: Routledge, 2006, 253 et seq.
127Report of the Commission of Inquiry, paras. 186, 241 et seq.; Burghardt/Geneuss (2009), 127.
128Report of the Commission of Inquiry, paras. 72, 196, 226 et seq.; Burghardt/Geneuss (2009),
127.
129Resolution 1593 (2005), adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 
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Thus, the crimes committed in Darfur are subject to the court's jurisdiction 
although the Republic of Sudan is not a State party to the ICC Statute 
(Arts. 13 (b), 12 (2) of the ICC Statute).
On 1 June 2005, the Prosecutor decided to initiate investigations 
according to Art. 53 (1) of the ICC Statute. So far, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
which has been assigned to the respective situation issued warrants of 
arrests against Ahmad Harun, the Former Minister of State for the Interior, 
Ali Kushayb, an alleged leader of the Janjaweed militias130 and Omar 
Hassan Al Bashir, President of Sudan since 16 October 1993.131 Each of 
these warrants is related to several counts of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes but none of them contains the charge of genocide. However, 
the Prosecutor's application for the warrant of arrest against Al Bashir 
actually included the accusation of genocide.
In the following, the report of the Commission as well as the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I regarding the arrest warrant against Al Bashir will be 
scrutinized particularly with regard to the pertinent question of a genocidal 
plan or policy requirement.
2. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry
The mandate of the Commission was focused on four key tasks, namely
“(1) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law in Darfur by all parties; (2) to determine whether or not acts of genocide 
have occurred; (3) to identify the perpetrators of violations of international 
2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005).
130Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-
Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 27 April 2007.
131Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), 
decision of 4 March 2009.
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humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and (4) to suggest means of 
ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable.”132
The report submitted to the Secretary-General on 25 January 2005 
provides a short overview on the role of the Commission and the historical 
and social background of the conflict. The main part deals with the findings 
regarding the pivotal issues mentioned above. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations are given.
Section II of the report exclusively discusses the decisive question 
whether the heinous atrocities committed in the Darfurian region constitute 
crimes under international law and particularly whether they must even be 
considered as genocide. After a short introduction to the general structure 
of the crime of genocide, a more detailed analysis regarding the scope of 
protected groups is given.133 Here, the Commission examines whether 
tribal groups are protected by international rules proscribing genocide and 
concludes that
“tribes may fall under the notion of genocide set out in international law only if [...] 
they also exhibit the characteristics of one of the four categories of group protected 
by international law.”134
Furthermore, it is briefly mentioned that the specific genocidal intent could 
be inferred from circumstantial evidences135 and that there was no 
hierarchy of crimes under international law.136
After these general remarks, the report addresses the concrete issue of 
132Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Executive Summary, p. 2, see also paras. 2 et seq.
133Ibid., paras. 489 et seq.
134Ibid., para. 497.
135Ibid., paras. 502 et seq.
136Ibid., paras. 505 et seq.
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genocide in Darfur. It states that the Commission had gathered enough 
evidence to proof without any doubt that individual acts constituent of the 
crime of genocide had been committed on the territory of Darfur – namely 
systematic killings, large-scale causing of serious bodily or mental harm as 
well as massive and deliberate infliction of conditions of life bringing about 
physical destruction of a protected group like the destruction of villages 
and crops or the plunder of cattle.137 It further states that the conflicting 
tribes could at least subjectively be regarded as distinct ethnic groups.138 
However, while the Commission took the objective elements of the crime 
of genocide for granted, it denied the existence of the specific intent to 
destroy on the part of the Sudanese government due to the following 
reasons: Although the large scale and the nature of atrocities committed 
against members of African tribes as well as “racially motivated 
statements” could indicate the genocidal intent of the perpetrators, there 
would also exist converse evidence. The fact, that the government forces 
and militias in several instances had not executed all inhabitants of the 
attacked villages but only men they had considered to be rebels would 
clearly demonstrate that they had not act with the aim to annihilate an 
ethnic group as such.139 In addition, the survivors of attacks had also not 
been killed but collected in camps for internally displaced persons. 
Although the living conditions in these camps had been dreadful they had 
not been “calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic group”.140
Thus, the Commission came to the conclusion that though “two elements 
137Ibid., para. 507.
138Ibid., para. 512.
139Ibid., paras. 513 et seq.
140Ibid., para. 515.
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of genocide might be deduced from the gross violations of human rights 
perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control”, the 
decisive criterion of the crime, the special intent to destroy, would seem to 
be lacking “at least as far as the central Government authorities are 
concerned.” The attacks against villages and members of some tribes in 
Darfur were not executed with the purpose of annihilating these tribes but 
rather on grounds of counter-insurgency warfare.141 Hence, the 
Commission hold the view that although punishable acts in the sense of 
Art. 6 (a) - (c) of the ICC Statute were committed against members of one 
of the protected groups they can not be labelled as genocidal conduct. 
Therefore,
“the Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a 
policy of genocide.”142
However, the Commission emphasised that other crimes under 
international law namely war crimes and crimes against humanity had 
been committed in Darfur and that these crimes are not necessarily of less 
serious or heinous character than genocide.143
The Commission established a correlation between the question whether 
genocide had been committed in Darfur and the existence of a genocidal 
plan or policy by putting this question in the centre of its analysis. Some 
authors took the Commission's report as a reason to “reopen” the debate 
whether a state plan or policy is a legal element of genocide.144 Schabas, 
141Ibid., para. 518.
142Ibid., para. 518.
143Ibid., paras. 519, 522.
144Kress (2005), 562 et seq.; Schabas, in: Henham/Behrens (eds.) (2007), 43.
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for example, concludes that the findings “helped to confirm the existence 
of an implicit or unspoken element in the crime of genocide”.145 This view 
has to be rejected. The report explicitly states that
“[t]he Commission [...] recognise that in some instances individuals, including 
Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent. Whether this was the 
case in Darfur [...] is a determination that only a competent court can make on a 
case by case basis.”146
Although a genocidal plan or policy on part of the Sudanese government 
had not been determined, the Commission did not exclude that genocidal 
acts were committed by individuals or even by state officials on Darfurian 
territory. Quite contrary, it explicitly took this possibility into account. 
Hence, the Commission did obviously not consider the existence of a 
genocidal plan or policy as a legal ingredient of the crime. Otherwise, the 
commission of genocide in Darfur would be impossible due to the fact that 
one of its legal elements – namely the contextual element – was lacking.147
3. The Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Al Bashir
As mentioned above, on 14 July 2008 the ICC's Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, applied for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the 
incumbent President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Al Bashir, “for his alleged 
criminal responsibility in the commission of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes against members of the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa groups in Darfur from 2003 to 14 July 2008.”148 The assigned 
145Schabas, in: Henham/Behrens (eds.) (2007), 47.
146Report of the Commission of Inquiry, para. 641.
147Kress  (2005),  577  et  seq.;  Andrew  B.  Loewenstein  and  Stephen  A.  Kostas,  “Divergent 
Approaches  to  Determining  Responsibility  for  Genocide.”  Journal  of  International  Criminal 
Justice 5 (2007), 839 at 852.
148ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp and ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Anxsl-89; Corrigendum ICC-02/05-151-
US-Exp-Corr  and  Corrigendum  ICC-02/05-151-US-Exp-Corr-Anxsl  &  2.  Public  redacted 
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Pre-Trial Chamber therefore examined the three issues required for the 
issuance of an arrest warrant: first, whether the case falls in the jurisdiction 
of the court and its admissibility, second, whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that Al Bashir at least committed one crime under the 
court's jurisdiction and, third, whether the procedural requirements 
according to Art. 58 of the ICC Statute are given. While the chamber 
decided to issue the requested arrest warrant in relation to crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, the Majority of the chamber did not follow the 
Prosecutor's application regarding the crime of genocide.149 Concerning 
this matter, it is stated that
“[...] the Majority finds that the materials provided by the Prosecution in support of 
the Prosecution Application fail to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the 
[Government of Sudan] acted with dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in whole 
or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, and consequently no warrant of 
arrest for Omar Al Bashir shall be issued in relation to counts 1 to 3.”150
However, the chamber emphasised the possibility to amend the existing 
arrest warrant to the count of genocide, pursuant to Art. 58 (6) of the ICC 
Statute, if the Prosecutor would provide additional evidence regarding the 
special intent.151
The main part of the decision deals with the decisive question whether 
reasonable grounds exist to assess the commission of genocide on the 
territory of Darfur. The chamber opened its respective explanations with a 
version of the Prosecution  Application, ICC-02/05-157-AnxA;  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir,  ICC 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 4 March 2009, para. 4.
149Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 4 March 2009.  Judge Anita 
Usacka dissents from the findings of the Majority in relation to genocide. See Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka.
150Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 4 March 2009, para. 206.
151Ibid., para. 207.
38
 
 
 
 
reference to Art. 6 of the ICC Statute and the corresponding Elements of 
Crimes as the legal basis for convictions on this count. Here, it explicitly 
ruled, inter alia, that one of the requirements that had to be met for the 
existence of the crime of genocide under the Statute is the last (common) 
element in the Elements of Crimes on genocide. In other words, the 
individual genocidal acts always had to take place "in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was 
conduct that could itself effect such destruction”.152
Then, some remarks on this contextual element follow – in form of an 
obiter dictum – which are of utmost significance for the question under 
consideration in this paper. First of all, the chamber recognised that 
neither the Genocide Convention nor the ICTY, the ICTR or the ICC 
Statute contained any kind of circumstance requirement in form of an 
overall genocidal campaign and that the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals 
had also rejected the existence of such an element.153 Then, the chamber 
alluded to the circumstance requirement included in the Elements of 
Crimes and stated – contrary to the ICTY and ICTR case law – that the 
individual acts must indeed be committed as a part of a genocidal pattern 
and that
“[...] the crime of genocide is only completed when the relevant conduct presents a 
concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group, or a part thereof.”154
Hence, the Majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I subscribed to the view that the 
crime of genocide comprised an objective contextual element and – 
152Ibid., para. 113.
153Ibid., paras. 117 et seq.
154Ibid, para. 124. Judge Usacka disagreed with this view, Separate and Partly Opinion of Judge 
Anita Usacka, paras. 16, 20.
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beyond that – even required the existence of a real threat to the existence 
of a protected group. The chamber's argumentation was the following:
First, it underlined the character of the crime of genocide as an “ultima 
ratio mechanism” which was aimed at the preservation of “the highest 
values of the international community”. These values were only be 
touched if the existence of a targeted group was concretely threatened.155 
In the chamber's view, this interpretation was “fully consistent with the 
traditional consideration of the crime of genocide as the "crime of the 
crimes".156
In awareness of the existing controversy regarding the acceptance of a 
contextual element, the chamber alluded to Art. 21 (a) of the ICC Statute 
and stressed that the court had to apply the sources of law listed in this 
article in the first place. Only in cases where the ICC Statute itself, the 
Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence revealed a 
lacuna that could not be filled by means of interpretation in accordance 
with Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties and 
Art. 21 (3) of the ICC Statute, other sources of law mentioned in Art. 21 (b) 
and (c) of the ICC Statute – like the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals – 
became relevant.157
The chamber further pointed out that the Elements of Crimes may be 
applied without restrictions as long as they are not irreconcilable to the 
provisions of the ICC Statute. In the chamber's opinion, the context 
element does by no means contradict Art. 6 of the ICC Statute. Quite 
155Ibid., para. 124.
156Ibid., para. 133.
157Ibid., paras. 125 et seq.; see also Burghardt/Geneuss (2009), 132.
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contrary, the Elements of Crimes would rather provide an “a priori legal 
certainty on the content of the definition of the crimes” under the court's 
jurisdiction and are therefore indispensable with a view to the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle laid down in Art. 22 of the ICC Statute. This 
principle “would be significantly eroded” if the application of the Elements 
of Crimes were not compulsory for the chambers of the court.158
The reasoning of the Majority was not convincing. First of all, it is 
exclusively concentrated on methodological considerations but did not 
take material aspects of the crime of genocide and its controversial 
definition into account.159 It must be strongly criticised that the chamber 
regarded the ICTY and ICTR case law as absolutely irrelevant unless 
there exists a legal loophole in the sources of law listed in Art. 21 (a) of the 
ICC Statute. The decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals are of significant 
relevance for defining and specifying international criminal law as such.160 
Thus, the chambers of the ICC should at least take them into 
consideration to avoid inconsistencies between its findings and the 
existing body of international criminal law.161 Besides, it is quite 
disappointing that the chamber – without any further explanations – 
established that the Elements of Crimes did not contravene Art. 6 of the 
ICC Statute. In consideration of the fact, that there is no indication of a 
circumstance requirement in the wording of Art. 6 of the ICC Statute this 
finding is surprising. Here, another problematic aspect of the chamber's 
decision arises, namely the addition of a new requirement – the existence 
158Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber I), decision of 4 March 2009, paras. 128 et 
seq.
159Werle (2009), para. 746.
160See, for example, Mettraux (2005), 199.
161Burghardt/Geneuss (2009), 133.
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of a real threat to the targeted group – that does not even occur in the 
Elements of Crimes.162
V. Conclusion
Both, the report of the Commission of Inquiry as well as the decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I on the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Al 
Bashir are of high importance in respect of the question under 
consideration in this paper namely whether a genocidal plan or policy is a 
legal element of the crime of genocide. However, as demonstrated above, 
they took up contradictory positions: While the Commission assumed that 
a genocidal plan or policy is no legal element of the crime of genocide, the 
ICC chamber held the view that the individual conduct of a genocidaire 
had to be committed in the context of a genocidal pattern and even 
required a concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group. The 
position taken by the chamber is open to criticism beyond the already 
mentioned aspects:
First, it is inconsistent with present customary international law that does 
not acknowledge a circumstance requirement as a legal ingredient of the 
crime of genocide. Although the court is not obliged to apply exclusively 
rules of customary law but is only bound by its Statute, it should abstain 
from substantially dissenting decisions. This would probably result in 
unintended inconsistencies between customary international law and the 
law developed by the court which again could be disadvantageous for the 
desired worldwide acceptance of the ICC.
162Ibid., 133.
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Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that in cases of referrals by 
the UN Security Council, the court's jurisdiction even comprises situations 
occurred in states that did not accede to the statute – as recently 
happened in the Darfur case. Although this procedure is authorised by the 
UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, it is not 
entirely unproblematic to interpret and apply provisions of the ICC Statute 
in a manner that do not comply one-to-one with rules of customary 
international law to non-State parties.
The decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I is also precarious due to the fact that 
it disregards the intention of the State parties which decided against – or 
at least did not agree on – the incorporation of a contextual element into 
the ICC Statute itself. Even though the drafters of the Elements of Crimes 
finally settled on the inclusion of such an element, they left its legal 
character undefined. The reasoning of the chamber in this regard is by no 
means sufficient. Anyway, it should not be possible to add any legal 
elements to the crimes under the court's jurisdiction through the backdoor 
of the Elements of Crimes. Their function should be limited to specifying 
Arts. 6, 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute but they should not be used to 
supplement these crimes when there is no basis in their wording. The 
Majority of the chamber even set a requirement that does not appear in 
the Elements of Crimes which is completely unacceptable.
For the future, the ICC should strictly stick to the provisions of its Statute 
defined by the State parties at the Rome Conference and, at the same 
time, should not lose sight of the rules recognised under customary 
international law. Certainly, it is thinkable that a contextual element will 
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prove to be part of the crime of genocide. However, to facilitate this 
process it seems to be indispensable to formally incorporate such an 
element into the statutes of the international criminal courts or even to 
agree on a modification of the Genocide Convention.
Words: 10.000 (excluding footnotes)
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